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I. INTRODUCTION

The first area rate proceeding conducted by the Federal Power
Commission is now pending before the United States Supreme Court.'
In this proceeding, the Federal Power Commission established ceiling prices for natural gas produced in the Permian Basin area of
Texas and New Mexico and sold to interstate pipelines. In additional
proceedings, now at various stages of prosecution, the Commission
will establish ceiling prices for the other gas producing areas of the
United States.2 The Permian Basin decision raises a fundamental
question about price regulation in an era freed from the constraints of
substantive due process: What legal standards govern price regulation under traditional American regulatory statutes providing for
"just and reasonable" rates?
In the Permian Basin decision the Federal Power Commission
established a ceiling price of 16.5 cents per thousand cubic feet (known
* This article was prepared as part of a larger study of natural gas price regulation being conducted by the author for the Law and Economics Program of the

University of Chicago.
t B.A. 1961, Yale University. J.D. 1964, University of Chicago. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
I Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, cert. granted, 388 U.S. 906 (1967), to review
Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967), rev'g and remanding Area Rate
Proceeding 61-1 (Permian Basin), F.P.C. Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. 159 (Aug. 5, 1965).
2
See Southern Louisiana (Initial Decision, Dec. 30, 1966); Hugoton-Andarko
(Hearings completed); Texas Gulf Coast (Hearings completed); Other Southwest

(Instituted Feb. 28, 1967). These five proceedings together account for 93 per cent
of the natural gas sold in interstate commerce. F.P.C. Press Release No. 14822
(Feb. 28, 1967).
(191)
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in industry argot as "an MCF") for new gas well gas' and 14.5
cents per MCF for gas well gas committed to interstate commerce prior
to January 1, 1961 and all gas produced in association with oil.4
This "two price system," as it is labeled by the Commission, is designed to carry out a policy of economic price discrimination. The
two price system separates the market for new gas, in which supply
is responsive to price (or elastic) because it is still in various stages
of development, from: (1) the market for old gas in which supply is
unresponsive to price (or inelastic) because the producer is legally
obligated to supply it; (2) gas produced in association with oil, in
which supply is inelastic because it is an inevitable by-product of oil
production. Both price ceilings are subject to quality discounts for
gas which is below pipeline quality in pressure or impurities content.
The Commission also raised to 9.0 cents per MCF the price of natural
gas flowing under contracts providing for a price below that level.
The decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit. Numerous contentions irrelevant to this article
were advanced there: notably, that area rate proceedings are not permissible under the Natural Gas Act and that the Commission's procedures were improper. The court upheld the Commission on these
points,5 relying quite persuasively on Wisconsin v. FederalPower Commission (Phillips II).' However, the court of appeals found a conceptual flaw in the Commission's determination of the ceiling prices.
The Commission had relied on complex cost computations to set the
ceiling rates at a level which would enable the industry to recoup its
"costs." But the Commission then made the ceiling prices subject
to quality discounts without finding, or having any basis in the record
for finding, what the impact of the quality discounts would be on the
ability of the industry to recoup its costs. The court, therefore,
remanded the case to the Commission for a determination of the impact of the quality discounts on the industry's ability to recover its
costs under the regulation.7 Since there is substantial evidence that
cost was not, in fact, the exclusive or even the most important factor
in the Commission's determination of the ceiling prices, the Tenth
Circuit's ground for reversal is rather ironic.
3 Price inclusive of Texas production taxes. The New Mexico ceiling is 15.5
cents plus applicable production taxes as of the date of the decision. Hereinafter
referred to as the "new gas" price.
4The New Mexico ceiling is 13.5 cents plus taxes. Hereinafter referred to as
the "old gas" price.
6 Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967).
e373 U.S. 294 (1963).

7375 F.2d at 35.
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The facts of the case raise three basic issues for the law of price
regulation. First, can non-cost considerations permit or even require
a regulatory Commission to set rates higher than cost? Second, does
the PermianBasin decision constitute a price freeze and, if so, is such
a price freeze permissible under traditional American regulatory
statutes? Finally, to what extent can prices be regulated so as to
require, as opposed to permit, price discrimination? This article will
discuss these three issues in the factual context of the Permian Basin
decision.
II.

STANDARDS FOR PRICES

When the Federal Power Commission announced its 1960 decision to abandon the individual cost of service approach to natural gas
price regulation and, instead, institute area rate proceedings, 8 it did
not clearly indicate the criteria it would follow in establishing area
prices. The Commission said:
Our ultimate objectives will be to set prices in all producing
areas which will be adequate to maintain the gas supplies
needed by the consumers of the nation, but at prices that are
no higher than are necessary to accomplish that purpose.
We intend to make use of cost data we have obtained in the
past and we intend to acquire and consider cost information
in the future. We also intend to use all information of an
economic nature we have acquired. .

.. '

The Supreme Court, which has provided the major impetus
towards natural gas producer regulation, has been even less helpful.
In PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Wisconsin (PhillipsI),1 ° where the Court
originally held that the Federal Power Commission had jurisdiction
to regulate natural gas field prices, it said nothing about the ap11
propriate method for determining prices. And when, in Phillips II,
the Court affirmed the decision of the Federal Power Commission
abandoning individual cost of service proceedings, it made only a
passing and elliptical reference to the fact that "we were advised at
oral argument that composite cost-of-service data will be considered
in the area rate proceedings." 1
Nor did Supreme Court cases construing the meaning of "just
and reasonable" rates under the Natural Gas Act, as applied to natural
gas pipeline companies, offer any clear guidelines. The leading case,
8 Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 542-48 (1960).
9Id. at 547.
10 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
11

Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).

1Id. at 310.
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Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.' 3 was openended, expressly rejecting the reproduction cost formula, while observing that "it is the result reached not the method employed which is
controlling." "' In this situation, the primary issue to be resolved in
the PermianBasin decision was the appropriate method for establishing prices. As a foundation for analysis, it is useful to set out four
alternative methods 5 which might be used to set natural gas field
prices.
1. The Surrogate Market. The Commission could set a price
which would balance supply and demand. Under this method the
Commission would start with the market price, and then adjust it
to compensate for market "imperfections."
The producers in the
PermianBasin case advocated a form of this method when they argued
that the Commission should set area rates on the basis of negotiated
contract prices." This method would be of questionable legality.
The Commission once used it in a pipeline rate case by including in
the pipeline's cost of service the value of the pipeline's own gas production priced at "the weighted average arm's length payments for identical natural gas in the fields." '" The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed in FPC v. City of Detroit, 8 on the ground
that, under the Natural Gas Act, cost must be used "at least as a
point of departure." "9 The problem with this method is that it is
difficult to find a rationale for a type of regulation which accomplishes
exactly what the market accomplishes.
2. Price-result method. Under this method the Commission
would approach the problem of price in terms of the result that any
given price level, and any change in price level, would have on the
industry. This method is significantly different from the surrogate
13320 U.S. 591 (1944).
141d. at 602.
15 A fifth method, often used under other regulatory statutes, is designed to
protect an industry, such as air transport regulation or agricultural commodity regulation. It has as its primary focus the financial health of the industry and attempts
to set prices high enough and to restrict entry sufficiently to assure that firms in the
industry will operate profitably. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Natural gas regulation, however, is consumer protective, not industry protective,
see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), and this method would
be inappropriate in Permian Basin.
'OArea Rate Proceeding 61-1 (Permian Basin), F.P.C. Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C.
159, 180-83 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Opinion 468].
T
1 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 13 F.P.C. 53, 76 (1954).
18230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
'DId. at 818. The Supreme Court read City of Detroit narrowly in a footnote
to Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 310 n.16 (1963), but the footnote dealt with the
issue of whether area rate proceedings were legal, not whether costs could be disregarded.
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market method, because the Commission would not attempt to set
the price at a level which would balance supply and demand. Rather,
the Commission would determine the amount of gas "needed" and
set a price appropriate to elicit that supply. The Commission would
examine the available supply of gas and decide whether it was excessive, sufficient or insufficient. If sufficient, the price would be left
at its present level; if excessive, it would be lowered; if insufficient,
it would be permitted to rise. If the amount of gas demanded at the
price set exceeded the amount supplied, the Commission would ration
the supply among the potential customers.
The Hope case,"0 read broadly, envisions the use of this method.
In Hope, which dealt with price regulation of a single company, the
Court stressed the need to relate the regulated price to its impact on
the financial health and stability of the company. In the context of
area rates, the emphasis on result would seem to require that the Commission set the area rates at a level which would elicit sufficient supply
and in a manner which would not cause disruption of the industry's
financial stability and development efforts.
In the Permian Basin decision, the Commission considered the
level of supply in setting price ceilings. Producers contended that
the reserves-to-production ratio had fallen too low. The Commission
rejected this contention,2 1 but said that ". . . the adequacy of reserves
is an important factor in our determination here, and will continue
to be an important factor in reviewing area rates in the future .
".2
3. Costs. Cost computations are the traditional method for
regulatory determination of prices. This is the method used in pipeline rate cases under the Natural Gas Act and by the Commission in
the PermianBasin case. Reference to costs as a basis for price determination in area rate cases was approved by the Supreme Court in
Phillips II." The rationale for relying on costs is that regulation
should result in the lowest possible price to the consumer, and the price
which permits the industry to earn its costs is the lowest price which
can fairly be imposed on the industry. The difficulty with the method
is that it is hopelessly circular in the context of a competitive industry,
such as natural gas exploration and development, where there are no
legal restraints on entry and no legal obligation to provide the service.
Over the long run, if the Commission sets the price of natural gas
at 16.5 cents per MCF on the basis of cost, the industry only will
20

FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).

21 Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 183-85.
22
1d. at 185.
23 Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 310 (1963).
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invest resources worth up to 16.5 cents per MCF in the development
of natural gas. A sixteen and a half cent price will elicit a sixteen
and a half cent cost.
4. Price control. Price control as a method of regulation has
been undertaken in the United States chiefly in wartime. Under price
control, the basic determinant of prices is historical. Prices are frozen
as of the date price control is instituted. A variant of this recently
has been advanced in the Presidential price-wage guidelines, under
which prices are frozen at their present level subject to an annual allowance for increases in productivity. The most significant use of
this type of regulation, apart from wartime price control, has been in
rent control.24
Price control has a special history in the field of natural gas.
The Supreme Court sanctioned regulation of this type in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Commission (CATCO), which was decided against the background of the sharp natural gas field price
rise which occurred during the 1950's. The increases were spurred
by developments in the technology of gas transportation and the construction of additional pipelines to the fields. Natural gas producers,
who formerly had faced a single pipeline monopsonist, suddenly found
that they could bargain for a higher price from the now competitive
pipelines. 26 At about the same time, large reserves of natural gas,
advantageously located in relation to the important east coast markets,
were discovered in southern Louisiana. These reserves brought unprecedented prices. In CATCO, the Federal Power Commission had
certified, as required by "public convenience and necessity," a sale of
Southern Louisiana gas under section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.' The
price of 22.4 cents per MCF was higher than any previously certified
price. The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of the Third Circuit
reversing the Commission, holding that the order of the Commission,
finding that the price of 22.4 cents was required by public convenience
and necessity, was not supported by the evidence. The Court based
its reversal on the structure of the Act. If the Commission approved
a rate under section 7 of the Act, it would be the effective rate unless
and until the Commission were to find subsequently that it was not
24
See, e.g., N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8581-97 (McKinney's Supp. 1967).
25360 U.S. 378 (1959).
26p. MAcAvoY, PRICE FORINIATION IN NATURAL GAS Fl.s
265 (1962), concludes: "As has been suggested by this long analysis of price formation in the 1950's,
gas markets were diverse in structure and behavior, and were generally competitive
or were changing from monopsony toward competition."
27Under section 7, a natural gas company must have a certificate of public convenience and necessity to authorize the construction of gathering facilities, after a
contract for the sale of the gas has been made. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1964).
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"just and reasonable" under section 5V8 No part of the price collected in the interim would be subject to refund-whether or not it
was just and reasonable at the time collected. Since the Commission,
in the late 1950's, was making very little, if any, progress on producer
rate regulation,2 9 that interim could be a very long period of time
indeed. If, on the other hand, the initial certificate of sale was conditioned on a lower, clearly legal price, the producer could still collect
a higher price by filing for an increase under section 4 of the Act.3 0
This increase, however, would be subject to refund if it were subsequently found not to result in a "just and reasonable" price. The
Court ordered the case remanded to the Commission for consideration
of the appropriate price conditions in light of the evidence. "Where
the proposed price is not in keeping with the public interest because
it is out of line .

.

.,"

wrote the Court, "the Commission in the

exercise of its discretion might attach such conditions as it believes
necessary." 3 1 As further elaborated by the Commission and the
courts of appeal, the opinion became the basis for the "in-line" pricing
doctrine under which the Commission would not certify a sale under
section 7 of the Act unless its price were no higher than the previously
0 2
prevailing price for uncommitted reserves in the area.
When the Commission announced the adoption of area rate proceedings in 1960, it also issued a set of guideline prices which continued the CATCO "in-line" approach. 33 Two guideline rates were
established for each gas producing area, except Southern Louisiana,
where litigation was still in progress over the appropriate level of the
"in-line" price. One rate (16 cents for the Permian Basin) was the
rate above which no new contracts for the sale of gas would be approved under section 7. This rate was established at approximately
the highest price at which new gas had previously been approved for
28 Section 5 empowers the Commission to reduce rates prospectively if they are
not just and reasonable. 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1964).
29The first producer rate case to be decided by the Commission was the remanded
Phillips I, 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960), decided six years after the Supreme Court found
that the Commission had jurisdiction.
30 Section 4 requires natural gas companies to file changes in rates with the Commission. The Commission can order an investigation of the change and suspend its
operation for five months. After that time, the change goes into effect, but the
Commission can require the natural gas company to furnish a bond for any refund
which subsequently may be ordered by the Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1964).
31 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959).
32A review of the in-line pricing doctrine as developed in the Commission and
the courts of appeal after CATCO is contained in Johnson, Producer Rate Regulation
in Natural Gas Certification Proceedings: CATCO in Context, 62 CoLum. L. REv.
773 (1962). The leading Supreme Court case applying the in-line pricing doctrine
is United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223 (1965).
33 Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960), as amended,
18 C.F.R. § 2.56 (1967).
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sale in the area, and simply carried out the "in-line" policy of
CATCOY 4 The other price (11 cents for the Permian Basin) was
the price above which no filing for a rate increase under section 4 of
the Act would be approved prior to determination of the area price.
This rate was set at the approximate average field price for 1959 in
the area.3 This guideline appears to have been an extension of the
CATCO "in-line" doctrine to section 4 of the Act.
The guidelines were issued without compliance with the notice
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act."6 Therefore, they
do not have the force of rules. Nevertheless, they have had a substantial impact on Commission action, although the Commission has been
able to avoid any challenge to their validity by never expressly relying
on them in making a decision. In section 7 cases, it has continued
to hear and rule on evidence in each case as to the "in-line" price,"
while all section 4 increases above the guideline have simply been consolidated with the area rate proceedings.
The price control method was not discussed in the Commission's
Permian Basin opinion. The Commission, in a general passage, did
say:
We believe the area approach should be adopted because it
is well adapted to the economic facts of the industry and the
practical administrative problems of carrying out the primary
purpose 8 of the Act, which is to achieve effective price
control .

But the significance of this passage is ambiguous. The Commission
did not mention the area price guidelines, nor suggest that area prices
should simply be set at historic levels. Nevertheless, the price for new
gas (16.5 cents subject to quality discounts) is so close to the section
7 guideline (16 cents not subject to quality discounts) that the price
34

This is made clear by the comparisons in Appendix B. Brief of Petitioner
Wisconsin at 51, Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
35"The old-gas levels announced for each area were essentially the average
weighted price for all gas sold from the area in interstate commerce in 1959, with
the figures rounded off to make a more consistent pattern." Brief of Petitioner
Wisconsin at 31, Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
365 U.S.C. §1003(a) (1964).
"General statements of policy" are exempted
from the notice requirement.
37 The in-line price has generally been somewhat less than the guideline price.
In Hawkins, F.P.C. Opinion 475 (Sept. 22, 1965), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 33 (1967),
rev'd, Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 373 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir.), the Commission
attempted to set the in-line price at the same level as the guideline price by relying
on prices of gas flowing under temporary certificates in determining what was "inline." Commissioner Black, dissenting from the Commission's decision, argued the
guideline price was a "statement of settlement policy" and that the in-line price
should be lower to discourage litigation. Hawkins, F.P.C. Opinion 475, at 4.
38 Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 178-79.
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control approach may well have played a part in the Commission's
price determination.
Thus, in the Permian Basin decision, the Commission rejected
the surrogate market method, gave passing consideration to the result
method, explicitly used the cost method and set prices at a level consonant with the price control method. The Commission thereby
avoided an explicit confrontation with the crucial issue in the case:
what method or methods should be used to determine regulated prices.
III. THE DETERMINATION OF PRICES IN Permian Basin
Although the Commission explicitly relied on costs in setting
prices in the Permian Basin decision, non-cost factors also played a
significant if not controlling role. This was acknowledged by the
Commission itself:
[W]e conclude that a composite cost showing must be the
basic ingredient in determining the area rate. This does not
mean that other factors should not be considered. The Commission must exercise its judgment and determine a rate in
light of all the evidence in the record. For one thing, the
rate must be one that the evidence indicates will elicit a level
of exploration activity adequate to provide the increased gas
supplies required by consumers in the future. There is also
a need to exercise judgment in the design of the rates to avoid
unnecessarily sharp and abrupt departures from existing pricing patterns and the business and community dislocations
which could result. Of course, in fixing the rate of return,
a key element in the cost determination, the Commission has
wide discretion to consider these factors, so that to a considerable degree they can be accommodated, within the framework of composite cost pricing. Nevertheless, we make clear
that we do not confine ourselves to a cost calculation in determining just and reasonable rates. 9
An examination of the actual cost computations in the Permian
Basin decision reveals the direction and magnitude of the non-cost
considerations. The Commission never indicates, however, at what
point, in what way and for what purposes non-cost factors influenced
its determination of the Permian Basin rate ceilings.
It is difficult for any discussion of the cost computations in the
Permian Basin case not to founder on the details of their construction.
The principal cost computation-the national cost of gas figures used
to fix the price for new gas-is based on the testimony of a distributorsponsored witness.40 Because of the lack of any uniform system for
4390 Id.

at 190.
Testimony of Herman G. Roseman. See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
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reporting or collecting cost data in the industry, the cost computations
rely on a wide variety of sources.4 1 The assemblage and coherent
presentation of this data is a truly virtuoso performance. The cost
of old gas, on the other hand, is based on questionnaires prepared by
the Commission staff and filled out by the large producers in the
Permian Basin.42 It is a more routine presentation, although there are
serious problems of its compatability with the cost of new gas.3 A
detailed examination of the possible choices involved in each item of
cost is a fruitless form of inquiry; particular choices usually can be justified by equally good arguments on either side. Ultimately, there is
little to rely on in making a choice other than the Commission's administrative expertise. However, two significant choices in the cost computations result in a major upward movement in the price of gas and are
difficult to accept. Some idea of the magnitude of this upward movement can be gained by comparing the staff's presentation with the
Commission's results. On the basis of the large company questionnaires, the staff computed the average cost of all raw gas produced
in the Permian Basin at 9.09 cents per MCF,44 using a 9.5 per cent
rate of return. The Commission concluded that the national cost
of new gas was 16.43 cents in 1960 4 and that the area cost of old
gas was 14.39 cents per MCF; "' both figures are more than 50 per
cent greater than the staff's cost estimates.
It is not possible to prove that the costs the Commission reached
are economically incorrect because there is no economically rational
way to allocate costs between the joint products-oil, gas and condensates. Even the costs of gas well gas are to a significant extent
joint with those of oil 47 In this situation, the Commission turned to
the legal tradition of regulatory cost computations and the standards
41 E.g., Questionnaires sent to producers by the Commission staff; the Census
of Mineral Industries for 1958; the Chase Manhattan Bank, 1961 Annual Analysis
of the Petroleum Industry; the World Oil Magazine; the Oil and Gas Journal; the
Joint Association Survey. Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC, 375 F2d 6, 24 (10th Cir. 1967).
42 The Commission did not rely on the small producer questionnaires because of
the low percentage returned. Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 214. The costs of those small
producers who returned the questionnaire were higher than for the major producers.
Compare Exhibit 171, Schedule 1, Record, Area Rate Proceeding 61-1 (Permian
Basin), F.P.C. Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. 159 (Aug. 5, 1965) [hereinafter cited as
Record] (Small Producers: 10.61 cents) with Exhibit 170, Schedule 1, id. (Major

Producers: 9.09).
4

3 See text accompanying notes 80-92 infra.
44 Exhibit 170, Schedule 2, Record.
45 Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 192.

46 d. at 218.
47 Exploration and development costs are significantly joint, even granting that
the industry can direct its search for oil or gas. Accepting the Commission's new
gas cost calculations, exploration and development constitute 38 per cent of the cost
of gas well gas. On the general problem, see the excellent discussion in M. ADELmAN,
THE SUPPLY & PRICE OF NATURAL GAS 28-33 (1962).
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of fairness on which they are implicitly based. It is possible to test
the Commission's use of these standards against norms of logical
consistency. Thus tested, the Commission made two major, questionable choices which resulted in a higher cost.
First, the Commission based its computations on a 12 per cent
industry-wide rate of return. The Commission supported this rate
of return by confusing individual rate making with area rate making.
For instance, the Commission considered as relevant the risk that an
individual producer will hit a dry hole." But Permian differs from
the usual rate proceeding, where the issue is the maximum amount that
a particular firm should be able to earn on its investment. Under the
Permian regulation there is no upper limit on what any single firm
can earn. If all investments in natural gas production actually
averaged a return of 12 per cent a year, capital would rapidly flow
into the industry. All that is necessary is a rate of return sufficiently
above the market rate of return to compensate for the special risks of
the petroleum industry. For the industry as a whole these risks would
appear to be small, since the law of averages works with inexorable
certainty in exploration and development. The average rate of return
on total assets in manufacturing industries for the period 1938 to
1956 was 7.2 per cent.49 The Commission has refused to permit a
pipeline a return higher than its overall return of 6.5 per cent on its
own production, even though the production risks for a single pipeline
are surely higher than for the entire production industry. 0 Although
it is extremely difficult to arrive at any figures on the basis of the
fragmentary data and non-inclusive averages in the Permian Basin
record, 12 per cent is substantially on the high side.
The Commission stated that the rate of return also reflected the
risk of finding gas of less than pipeline quality 51 -a clever way of
avoiding the quality discount problem. Since there was no evidence
in the record as to what those discounts would be, one can only say
that "risks" were involved. It is a novel doctrine, indeed, that the
rate of return should be adjusted to reflect the risk that the regulatory
cost computations are incorrect. The Commission concluded:
After weighing all the evidence on the issue we believe a
return of 12 per cent is appropriate in light of the considerations previously discussed and the presentations in this case,
particularly the testimony of witness Shaffner and Morton
48

Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 188.

49 G. STIGLER, CAPITAL AND RATES OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

34 (1963).

50 Southern Natural Gas Co., 34 F.P.C. 323, 335-38 (1963).

51 Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 202.
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with respect to the returns by non-integrated producers in
the Permian Basin. [But how can the rate of return of the
successful producers who have stayed in the business provide
a basis for finding an average, which must by definition include the return on the expenditures of those who have failed
as well as those who have succeeded?] It also considers
the needs of the smaller independent who traditionally drills
much of the Permian exploratory footage and his limited
resources to weather even a brief series of unproductive
expenditures."2
Second, the Commission decided not to include in its average costs
the cost of gas produced in association with oil. Gas produced in
association with oil is an inevitable by-product of oil production.
Although the computations for such gas require allocation of substantial joint costs, reasonable allocation methods result in a lower cost
than that for gas well gas (where all costs, other than exploration
and development, must be allocated entirely to the gas). The cost
of new gas did not, by definition, involve the cost of associated gas.
The old gas price applies to all associated gas. Yet the Commission
did not include in the cost of old gas the cost of associated gas.
The Commission gave only cost reasons for this decision but, as cost
reasons, they are questionable:
[W]e shall use the cost of gas-well gas as the yardstick for
all prices we fix in this proceeding. We do so for two reasons. First, the record reveals that casinghead gas and
other associated gas are found largely as a by-product of
the search for oil. [True also of old gas well gas.] Historically, casinghead gas has not been priced on a cost basis
[True of all gas. Has it been priced higher than cost?]
and any cost-finding technique is unrealistic which assigns
large sums for exploration and development to casinghead
gas. [Why not simply allocate less and lower the cost?]
A second and related reason is that gas-well gas costs are
much more meaningful because they are far less dependent
upon allocations between gas and oil than are the costs of
casinghead and other associated gas. [Less meaningful in
what sense?].'
Since two-thirds of the gas produced in the Permian Basin is produced
in association with oil,5 the decision not to include associated gas
in the cost computations was, in effect, a decision to base the cost
of gas in the area on only one-third of production. This decision,
521d. at 204.
531d. at 190.
54 Id. at 173.
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which was justified in terms of the difficulty of allocating joint costs,
results in a major upward movement in the resulting cost.
Thus, at two critical points the Commission made decisions which
had the effect of substantially increasing the resulting cost. Both of
these decisions are questionable from a strict cost accounting point
of view. Yet the Commission gave no indication of what, if any, noncost factors were influencing its decision, even though the Commission
emphasized in its opinion that it was relying on non-cost factors.

IV.

RESULT AS A LIMIT ON COST:

A DIGRESSION ON Hope

Must a regulatory commission set prices according to the results
of rigorous cost computations? Or are there significant non-cost
factors which may, or even must, be considered in determining prices?
The issue was raised in FederalPower Commission v. Hope Natural
Gas Co.55 Read traditionally, Hope established a permissive constitutional approach, the most important consequence of which was to
approve the use of original cost, rather than reproduction cost, in
the computation of a rate base. But the language of the opinion suggests a broader reading-that Hope freed price regulation from legal
accounting formulas, instead directing attention to the impact of
the regulatory price policy on the unregulated markets in which the
regulated firm must operate. The most important of these unregulated
markets for traditional utility regulation is the capital market. Hope
can be read to imply that the setting of prices on the basis of abstract
formulas, without attention to the results of those formulas in the
capital market, is unreasonable. In an ambiguous passage, the Court
said:
[T]he investor interest has a legitimate concern with the
financial integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated. From the investor or company point of view it is
important that there be enough revenue not only for operating
expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These
include service on the debt and dividends on the stock ...
By that standard the return to the equity owner should be
commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover,
should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and
attract capital." so
Hope, itself, was an easy case for the application of the test. Hope,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, had had
5320 U.S. 591 (1944).

5od.at 603 (emphasis added).
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an excellent history of earnings. The Court, therefore, upheld the
rate order, even though it was based on questionable rate base calculations. But could the converse ever be true? Could a rate based upon
correct cost of service calculations ever be unreasonable under Hope,
because of the results flowing from the computed price?
Discussion is facilitated by an example. Let us consider a small
electric distributor which provides a single service to an all-residential
community called Simpletown. Assume that capital expenditures each
year equal depreciation, so that the total investment remains the same.
The utility, Simpletown Electric Company, has been subject to regulation from the outset. The original capital of $1,000,000 was used
to purchase an existing distribution facility which, for several years,
had earned $80,000 per year. The regulatory commission with jurisdiction historically had regulated the facility on the basis of an original
cost rate base of $1,000,000 and allowed an eight per cent rate of
return. The Commission had announced its intention to continue
this policy. The company was financed with 50 per cent debt and
50 per cent equity. The bonds were sold at five per cent interest on
the market to investors fully apprised of the planned regulatory policy.
The stock was also sold and brought $500,000. The company subsequently earned $80,000 a year and the bondholders and stockholders received what they had expected to receive. In this regulatory nirvana, the Commission could simply sit back and leave the
rates set forever. The investors would have no basis for complaint;
they invested knowing what the policy would be. Consumers would
have no basis for complaint; they would be getting their electricity at
actual cost.
Now let us introduce two disruptive factors: inflation and an
increase in the demand for electricity."T The increase in demand can
result from the growth of Simpletown or from changes in consumer
preferences. It is also necessary to assume that the costs of constructing electric distribution facilities have increased."8
If Jt has the power to do so, the regulatory commission could
preserve the simplicity of the situation by refusing to permit the
utility to respond to the increased demand. If the increased demand
arises from the geographic expansion of Simpletown, the Commission might refuse to permit the old utility to expand and insist that
a new company be organized to serve the new areas. A two price
system-similar to that in the PermianBasin case-would then arise,
67 Deflation benefits the owners of the utility under original cost rate making.
They would, therefore, have no basis for complaint.

5s In spite of inflation, costs could have decreased due to technological improvements.
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with a price for "old" electricity sold by the original utility at the
historic cost and a price for the "new" electricity sold by the new
utility at current cost. But this type of situation is usually characterized by creeping growth. It is doubtful whether the Commission
would choose to require the construction of a completely new system,
thus ignoring the probable efficiencies of expanding the old system.
If the increased demand comes from the desire of the utility's
present customers to consume more electricity at the regulated price,
the Commission could refuse to permit the expansion and engage in
rationing. This system of rationing might be simple (the Commission could simply let the physical capacity of the system check consumption) or sophisticated (the Commission could attempt to determine the amount that customers would consume if the price were set
so that supply equalled demand, and then allocate the supply in that
amount). But rationing, in any form, is unlikely to be politically
palatable and the Commission would probably choose to approve
expansion.
Let us assume that the original construction costs have doubled.
The company contemplates a 50 per cent expansion of capacity at a
cost of $1,000,000. Assume also that capital rates are now at the
same level as they were at the time of the original construction.
Everything seems to remain simple; the construction is carried on,
the rate base doubles and so do the permitted earnings. This can be
achieved by permitting the Company to increase all its rates; r, or,
assuming no legal restrictions on the rate structure, the Commission
could permit the Company to charge an even higher rate on the "new"
electricity and continue the original rate on the "old" electricity, on
the theory that only consumers of the new electricity should pay for it.
The latter is precisely the price system adopted in Permian Basin,
although average cost pricing has traditionally been used instead.
But the situation is actually a bit more complicated. In the
original financing, investors took the risk that the established system
would continue to earn what it had earned in the past. The risks
involved in the expansion are greater: Will the Commission permit
the rates to be increased? How long will it take for permission to
be granted? Will the demand for the service be enough at the increased rate to actually result in a doubled profit? These are uncertainties which will drive up the cost of capital. Assuming that the
market cost of capital is the same as at the time of the original financ59 The percentage relationship between the new rate and the old would turn on
the relationship between operating expenses and total costs. If expenses were negligible, the increase would be one-third (% X % = 2). The larger the ratio -ofoperating expenses to total costs, the less the percentage increase necessary.
-,
-
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ing, the company will now need to earn more than eight per cent to
finance the expansion. Since the Commission limits the return to
eight per cent, the utility is unable to attract capital to finance the
expansion its customers demand, without diminishing the value of
the interest of its existing shareholders. The Hope test arguably is
violated.
What could the Commission do to avoid this result? Most
simply, it could increase the permitted rate of return. If the demand
for electricity is insufficient to support a higher price, this would fail.
In any case, it increases the cost of electricity. The Commission,
alternatively, could lower the cost of raising capital by reducing the
risk. This it could do in a number of ways. It might make known
to the investment community a promise to permit the increase promptly,
as soon as the new facilities are built. But the promises of regulatory
commissions are unenforceable, and the fact that the Commission
will permit the rate does not mean that the rate will increase revenues.
The Commission could reduce the risk still further by permitting the
increase-or at least part of it-before the expansion, thereby proving
both its willingness to permit the higher rate and the ability of the
company to attract business at that rate.
Thus, the demand for expansion, the need for external financing
and continuing inflation put pressure on regulatory commissions to
move away from the strict logic of original cost rate setting. 60 The
utility's cost of capital is increased to the extent that a commission
rigorously follows original cost logic. Yet a commission is charged
with a responsibility to insure that the public is obtaining service at
the lowest possible cost.
This hypothetical illustrates the situations in which considerations
of result might require that a rate be set higher than cost. Similar
considerations were operative in the Permain Basin case.
V. NATURAL GAS

AND

Hope

The situation in natural gas price regulation is more complicated
than that in traditional utility regulation, because natural gas price
regulation has significant consequences not only in the capital market,
but in two other markets as well: first, in the market for gas, where
interstate purchasers of gas, regulated by the Federal Power Commission, must compete with unregulated, intrastate purchasers; second, in the market for producing interests in gas wells, whose price
will be determined by the expected income stream from the well.
60

They can do so without abandoning the formal logic, by manipulating the rate

of return.
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The price of new gas is the price that will have the most impact.
The new gas price is the price that interstate pipelines must use to
bid gas purchases away from intrastate markets. Under the section
7 in-line price doctrine, the Commission, after 1960, would approve
sales in the Permian Basin at levels below 16 cents per MCF. What
would have been the consequences if the Commission had set the area
rate for new gas below this level?
Between 1960 and the effective date of the area rates, the Commission would have approved, under section 7, all rates under 16 cents
as required "by the public convenience and necessity." It would
then turn around and reduce those rates under section 5 as not "just
and reasonable." This involves, of course, no formal inconsistency.
But what would be the result? In the future, all sellers contemplating
a sale would know that their initial price, approved under section 7
of the Act, was not guaranteed for the life of the sales contract. Once
the gas is committed to interstate commerce it cannot be withdrawn.
Sellers' attorneys might note that the cost computations which support the prices in Permian Basin can easily be revised downward.
The reaction of sellers would automatically be simply to increase the
amount of the "premium" they insist upon for interstate sales, in order
to compensate for the risk that the Commission would lower the price
during the term of the contract. This does not mean that the interstate price would increase above 16 cents, since regulation would bar
that. Rather, it would mean that sellers would prefer to sell in the
intrastate market as long as they could stay, for example, within two
cents of the interstate price. The two cents would compensate the
seller for the risk of entering the regulated market with its threat
of downward price revision; it is a cost which the consumer would
ultimately pay. It hardly benefits the consumer if he has to pay 16
cents for 14-cent gas in order to compensate for the regulation supposedly designed to protect him. A statistical study based on 1958
figures showed that sellers required a 1.16 cent premium before selling
in the interstate market, to compensate for the costs and risks of regulation. 1 And in 1958 there was, as yet, only a vague and unsubstantiated fear that the Commission would impose a price freeze.6 If, in
place of that risk, there is the risk that at any time the Commission
61 Gerwig, Natural Gas Production: A Study of Costs of Regulation, 5 J. LAw
& EcoN.
69, 85 (1962).
62 Gerwig found that fear of a price freeze accounted for about 27 per cent
of the 1.16 cent premium. Id. at 88. Gerwig concluded "that natural gas producers
in the Gulf Coast from 1956 to 1958 held a rather low probability estimate, around
22 per cent, of a price freeze precluding escalation of price for their interstate contracts." Id. This estimate was probably a correct reading of the- Commission. But
the Court did impose a price freeze in 1959-60 in CATCO and succeeding cases.
See F.P.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
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can and -may revise its rates downward, the premium will be substantially higher. On the other hand, if the industry is confident that
the area rate will be maintained, the amount of the premium will be
less and interstate consumers will get more gas for the same amount
of money.
The Commission was sensitive to the fact that the threat of
future downward revision could undermine the effectiveness of the
new gas price in attracting new supplies.
In order to assure that every effort will be made by producers to bring in new gas-well gas we also state our conviction that the ceiling set in this proceeding should continue
to apply to all such new gas dedicated within the ceiling fixed
herein even if in any later review of the area rate for the
Permian Basin the evidence indicates that a lower price would
be justified for future discoveries. We cannot bind the Commission for the future, but we state our view that any lower
ceiling should apply only to new gas dedicated after the ceiling price may have been subsequently reduced.'4
Since the Commission cannot be bound, actions are likely to be more
convincing than words. No matter what the Commission says, its
"promises" for the future are likely to be taken seriously only if the
price levels which it has sanctioned in the past continue to be respected.
If the in-line price is acknowledged as a floor price by the Commission,
the industry can have more confidence that, in the future, the new gas
price will be recognized as a floor. The Commission explicitly recognized the need not to disrupt past "expectations of producers," when
it set the date for the division between old and new gas at January 1,
1961, instead of at the date of the decision, even though the higher
price for new gas could not possibly operate as an incentive to develop
gas already committed before it was announced. 4
The problem of respecting the in-line price and, at the same time,
justifying price on the basis of cost has become acute in the Southern
Louisiana area rate case. The Commission in Permian Basin established the price for new gas on the basis of national cost. Consistency
requires that the formula be followed in Southern Louisiana, even
though price levels in Southern Louisiana have been higher than
in the Permian Basin because gas in Southern Louisiana is found in
larger quantities and is closer to the major east coast heating markets.
The in-line price in Southern Louisiana has been 20 cents,"5 while in
83

64

Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 188.
Id. at 188-89.

65 Including state production taxes. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 376
161, 164 (10th Cir. 1967). The in-line price in Southern Louisiana has fluctuated as a result of the litigation following CATCO. A summary of its rather
complex history can be found in id. at 165-67.

F.2d
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Permian it was 16 cents. The Examiner in Southern Louisiana followed the Permian computations, with some minor changes. By
using a higher royalty rate " and by taking into account higher production taxes within Louisiana, he was able to arrive at 18.5 cents.
But this was still 1.5 cents less than the applicable in-line price of
20 cents. To reduce the problem, the Examiner added an additional
incentive factor of one cent.67 The Examiner based this "fudge
factor" on the fact that Southern Louisiana has been and continues to
be the chief area in which new gas supplies are found."8 The Examiner
did not explain, however, why it is more important to encourage exploration in Southern Louisiana than in the Permian Basin. In fact,
one could logically conclude that, since exploratory activity has been
so successful in Southern Louisiana, a lower price would attract sufficient supply, while in the Permian Basin, where exploration has been
less successful, a higher price is required.
Although the one cent fudge factor reduced the difference between
the area rate and the in-line price presently applied in Southern
Louisiana to one-half cent, the result was that rates approved in prior
section 7 proceedings would be reduced. A special, related problem
arose in Southern Louisiana because the Commission, during the
pendency of the proceeding, had settled several section 4 proceedings at
prices ranging from 18.125 cents to 20.625 cents. The parties argued
that these settlement rates should be allowed to stand. The Examiner
66
In Permian,, the Commission used 12.5 per cent, because both the distributor
and producer rate witnesses used it and "no participant demurs to the inclusion of
such an item or to the 12.5 percentage." Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 206. A study
based on responses to staff questionnaires, introduced in Southern Louisiana, showed
that the average royalty was 15.7 per cent. See Area Rate Proceeding 61-2
(Southern Louisiana), Initial Decision 108 (Dec. 30, 1966). The 12.5 per cent
figure was apparently based on the widely held belief that all oil royalties are
one-eighth. This is not true. For instance, the important federal offshore leases
provide for royalties of one-sixth. The Examiner in Soithern Louisiana used 14
per cent as the average royalty figure. Id. at 109. This, in theory, requires a revision of the Permioni figures, if the Commission adopts it.
7
"tUnder all the circumstances of this case, and based upon the application of
discretion and judgment to the facts as developed in the instant record, it is concluded that an additional factor of 1 cent per MCF should be added to the determined new gas cost figures. . . ." Id. at 208. The Examiner in Permian Basin
anticipated this difficulty by applying a geographic discount of 1.25 cents to his cost
results to allow for the fact that Permian gas is less valuable than the national
average. Area Rate Proceeding 61-1 (Permian Basin), Initial Decision, 34 F.P.C.
306, 364-65 (Sept. 17, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Initial Decision]. The Commission
rejected the geographic discount. Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 207.
6S "For the 1956-1963 period, Southern Louisiana accounted for more than onethird of the total natural gas reserves added in the United States." Area Rate Proceeding 61-2 (Southern Louisiana), Initial Decision 206 (Dec. 30, 1966).
In the instant case it is concluded that in fixing the rate for new gas
well gas for the South Louisiana area, a relevant and prime factor which
should be considered above and beyond the determined cost is the particular
importance of the South Louisiana area to the nation's required natural
gas supply, both now and for the forseeable future.
rd. at 208.
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rejected the claim. 9 If the Commission affirms the Examiner's actions,
the message to the industry will be clear. All prices obtained in interstate sales must be discounted for the risk that the price wil be subsequently reduced.
The second important market in which the price regulation of
natural gas has significant consequences is the market for producing
interests. One of the important ways in which the exploration and
development segment of the industry can raise capital is by selling
producing interests in developed wells. The price these interests
bring will be the present value of the discounted income stream from
the gas. The rate at which that income stream is discounted will turn
on, among other factors, the risk that regulation will reduce that income stream. If the purchaser of the producing interest must take
into account the risk that rates presently permitted will be reduced in
the future as not just and reasonable, he will pay less for the interest.
Thus, in essence, the value of the end product of exploration and
development is reduced. Again, this consequence follows no matter
what the level of the ceiling. Assuming a constant 16 cent ceiling
price, producing interests will be more valuable if the risk that the
Commission will reduce that price is low and less valuable if the risk
is high. If the value of producing interests declines, the incentive for
exploration and development activity also declines. This increased
cost, or decreased responsiveness to price, results in no social gainit simply compensates for a risk which the regulation itself created.
The best criteria for the industry to use in evaluating the possibility
of future price reductions remains the Commission's past actionsare prices it has approved in the past respected in the present?
Since 1960, the Commission has approved increases on existing
contracts to levels at or below eleven cents. The value of producing
interests would have been based on that price, discounted by the risk
of a reduction. Therefore, although the level of increases permitted
is not as important as the in-line price in attracting gas away from
intrastate sales, it does affect the price which can be realized for
producing interests. If the Commission follows a policy of approving
increases to a given level, it should follow that policy in a way that
assures the maximum response to the permitted price. The Commission respected the eleven cent guideline price by a substantial margin,
70
setting a price of 14.5 cents for old gas.
In the Permian Basin decision there were strong reasons for respecting the area price guidelines as a floor on possible rates. The
6

91d. at 272-74.
7o Details of the old gas computations are discussed at text accompanying notes
83-92 infra.
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Commission apparently recognized this in Permian Basin by accepting
cost figures which resulted in prices above the guideline rates.
VI. Is PRICE CONTROL "JUST AND REASONABLE"?
The need to respect the guideline prices combined with price
levels justified on the basis of cost results in a price freeze. The Commission practically acknowledged this in its discussion of "Changes
in the Area Rate" in the Permian Basin decision. 1 It can be argued
that this is not so, because the price ceiling may always be revised upward in the future to recognize higher costs; but, as a practical matter,
this seems impossible. In economic terms, if the price of gas is set
at 16.5 cents, the cost of gas will be 16.5 cents. 2 There is no reason
to expect the future figures to be substantially higher than the 1960
figures, since the industry, in effect, has operated under a price freeze
since 1960. The only room for adjustment in the 1960 figures is
downward, since the Commission has already done its best to stretch
them upward. If the Hope "result" test bars a decline below present
levels on presently committed gas, the result is a permanent price freeze
on the gas. Hope bars a lower rate; costs cannot justify a higher one.
Can such a price freeze be "just and reasonable" under the Natural
Gas Act?
To simply freeze a price at its historic level is an inflexible approach to the task of price regulation. Congress, in drafting a statute
based on the Interstate Commerce Act, hardly could have meant to
include a price freeze within the concept of "just and reasonable" rates.
When it has wished to impose price control, Congress has been able
to specify what it wanted. For example, under the wartime defense
rent control act, Congress specified that rents should be set at the
April 1, 1941 level.1 3 It is clear that Congress had no comparable
71 Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 227-28. To assure this result, the Commission
imposed a moratorium on filings for rate increases until January 1, 1968. Id. at 230.
72 Economic costs, of course, include rents, but rents are not fully accounted for
in the Commission's computations. Some rents are included in the form of lease
acquisition costs and in royalties. The Commission's theory appears to be that all
rents which are reflected in payments made by the industry to "outsiders" should be
treated as "costs," but no others. See the discussion of the Examiner in Area Rate
Proceeding 61-2 (Southern Louisiana), Initial Decision 108 (Dec. 30, 1966), criticizing
the inclusion in the study of royalty rates, royalties actually paid to other firms in
the industry. To include rents, whose value depends on the anticipated income stream,
in the rate computations is circular, as the Court recognized in FPC v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944). The Commission was able to avoid confronting
this circularity by valuing the most significant payments reflecting rents, royalties, on
the basis of another circularity-the industry contract institution which defines the
amount of royalties as a percentage of price. Since the Commission's computations
do not include all rents, and since costs including rents will always equal price over
the long run, the Commission's cost computations, if carried out accurately, will
always result in a price less than the currently established price.

73 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 § 2(b), 56 Stat. 25-26.
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system -of price regulation in mind when it passed the Natural Gas
Act.74'

CATCO 75 might be cited in support of the proposition that

a price freeze is legal under the Natural Gas Act. However, the
CATCO holding was based not on the desirability of a price freeze,
but on the need to provide a refund mechanism for prices which might
later be found not to be "just and reasonable."
The two price system is crucial to the Commission's price freeze
policy. It enables the Commission to separate the price of gas which
is committed to interstate commerce from the price necessary to attract
sufficient new supplies. The price on committed gas is frozen while
the price for uncommitted reserves can be increased. This was recognized by Dr. Alfred Kahn,7 the distributor-sponsored witness who had
originated the two price system,7" and whose testimony was central
to the entire proceeding."8
Had the Commission explicitly followed a price freeze policy, it
probably would have violated the statutory standard. The Commission's cost computations are designed to protect this policy from attack
in the courts. Ironically, however, if the Commission defends Permian
on the ground that the cost computations were the actual basis for the
74 "The bill provides for regulation along recognized and more or less standardized
lines. There is nothing novel in its provisions, and it is believed that no constitutional question is presented." H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937);
S. Rm.
No. 1162, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
75
- Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959). The Court
emphasized the price freeze policy of CATCO and ignored the refund rationale in
United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U.S. 223 (1965), and
FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515 (1964).
76
Professor, Department of Economics, 'Cornell University.
17
7See

78

Record 7203-7375, particularly 7288-7375.

In his testimony, Dr. Kahn explicitly related his suggestion for a two price
system to wartime price control:
During World War II, for example, the United States Government imposed a ceiling on the price of copper, while offering various bonuses or
premiums to induce the expansion of higher-cost production from marginal
mines. This situation, a relatively inelastic supply in the face of sharp increases in demand, is obviously analogous to the position of gas in the last
ten years. Actually, a policy of this kind was adopted during World War II
in an even more precisely analogous situation. I refer to the subsidy that
was granted on certain classes of stripper-well oil production by the Office
of Price Administration from August, 1944, through November of 1945.
There was bitter controversy within the Administration about the desirability of such a subsidy, in contrast with a general price increase. The
Petroleum Administration for War proposed a blanket rise in the price of
crude oil of 35 cents a barrel, on the ground that the price ceilings established towards the close of 1941, while perhaps adequate to cover historical
costs, did not take into account the increased costs of finding and development. .

.

. This proposal was opposed by the Office of Price Adminis-

tration, on the ground that the price increase was unnecessary for the major
part of production, and would have conferred large windfall gains on the
industry at large, whereas a selective subsidy to marginal wells would cost
the consumer only a fraction of what a general price increase would have cost.
Record 7317. In a more informal setting, Dr. Kahn has referred to natural gas price
regulation as a "price freeze." Kahn, Economic Issues in Regulating the Field Price
of Natural Gas, 50 Am. EcoN. REv. 506, 514 (Conf. No. 1960).
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price ceilings and states that its future actions will be consistent with
them, the result is a price freeze. If it is truly the result reached, not
the method employed, which is controlling in judicial review of price
regulation,7" then the Court must confront the issue of whether such
a price freeze is just and reasonable under the Natural Gas Act.
VIi.

THE

Two

PRICE SYSTEM

The Permian Basin case, by adopting the two price system, follows the historic price control practice of setting the price for new
sources of supply higher than the price freeze level, in order to induce
additional supply. A two price system can also be justified on the
basis of a cost analysis which separates historic costs from future costs,
as the discussion of Simpletown Electric Company showed.
The two price system in PermianBasin raises a novel legal issue.
Concern with price discrimination in regulation has always centered
on the issue of the extent to which regulatory commissions should and
could permit firms to engage in differential pricing of similar or identical services. The issue of whether a commission can affirmatively
require a firm to engage in differential pricing has never been posed.
The Commission supported each price under the two price system
by means of a separate cost computation, basing the cost computation
for old gas on the historic cost of gas in the Permian Basin and the
cost of new gas on the national cost of finding gas in 1960. The computations of the cost of finding new gas were developed in the proceeding by distributor-sponsored witness Herman Roseman, who testified
that his computations were constructed within the framework of the
testimony of Alfred Kahn."° Roseman's presentation, however, is
not fully consistent with Kahn's testimony. Not only does he arrive
at a cost of gas somewhat lower than Kahn apparently had contemplated (14.03 cents)," but his method is also, for the most part, applicable to both old and new gas.82
7

9

Roseman never explains how one

See FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).

80 Record 14, 660.

81 Exhibit 224, Schedule 1, Record. Subsequently revised to 15.39 cents. Initial
Decision, 34 F.P.C. at 343. Kahn testified:
Based on various Commission and Examiner's decisions in proceedings
with which I am familiar, which find historic costs of gas in the 11 to 14
cent range, it would seem that the new gas prices listed in the Statement of
General Policy have a wide enough spread from these costs to provide the
kind of incentive to which I have been alluding in my testimony.
Record 7369.
82 Because it is largely made up of current expense items which apply to all gas
produced in 1960. Kahn, in his testimony, had little to say about the appropriate price
of old gas, taking the position that the price had little economic significance and
raised only a legal question. Record 7346, 7366. But Kahn indicated the cost of
old gas should be based on historic costs, a recommendation the Commission ultimately
accepted. Id. 7346. Roseman, however, presented no computations for the cost of
old gas.
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can develop a cost for old gas consistent with his presentation for the
cost of new gas. The most important items are exploration and development costs. These he does not capitalize. Instead, he arrives at
a cost of 3.00 cents for finding an MCF of gas, and then adds an
"Allowance for Growth" of 1.11 cents. While the title is impressive,
the amount is, in fact, the amount necessary to permit recovery of
exploration and development costs from current production. As a
result, the total finding cost figure of 4.11 cents is applicable not only
to volumes of new gas, but also to volumes of all gas produced.
When the Examiner decided to adopt Kahn's two price system,
he was left with a serious problem. As the price for new gas he could
adopt Roseman's testimony. He had no trouble pushing these figures
up above the guideline price (to 16.88).3 For the cost of old gas,
however, the Examiner had to develop an ingenious system, using an
average backtrend of costs for gas produced before 1960. This showed
that, on the average, the cost of finding and developing such gas had
been 75 per cent of 1960 costsY4 He then took 75 per cent of the
exploration and development costs and successful well costs and used
these to compute a cost for old gas. The result was a cost of 12.82
cents."5 The Examiner first broached this system during Roseman's
testimony and, although Roseman was hesitant,8 the Examiner used
it. But he made a serious error. Since exploration and development
costs were treated as current expense, they represented current conditions and appropriately could not be backtrended. It is difficult to see
why he made this error. Perhaps it was the only way he could get a
computational result close to the guideline differential (11 and 16) .87
On review, the Commission recognized the error,88 but apparently felt that there was an even more serious problem with the
Examiner's method. The Examiner essentially had reached an historic cost for old gas without relying on actual historic figures. Use of
current figures plus price trends is a circuitous way of arriving at
actual costs and the possibility of large error is inherent in the method.
The Commission decided to rely on the historic costs for the Permian
Basin, as developed by the staff on the basis of the large company ques83

Initial Decision, 34 F.P.C. at 343.

84 Id.at 356.
85 Id. at 357.

86Record 20, 564. "[I]f there is any implication that one could make such a
trending in a relatively simple manner, I would be very skeptical of that. You would
have to consider a whole set of expenditures and investments and so forth."
87The Examiner's spread in his final rates was 16.75 to 12, extremely close to
the 5 cent guideline spread. As part of his rate design, the Examiner adjusted his
cost figures by means of a geographic discount and a gold standard. Initial Decision,
34 F.P.C. at 363-71. This aspect of the Examiner's decision was not followed by
the Commission. See Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 174-75.
S8Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 218-19.
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tionnaires8 9 These figures contained their own exploration and
development costs developed historically. New gas costs, however,
were developed on the assumption that exploration and development
costs were a current expense. Thus, the new gas computations were
inconsistent with the historical computations. But the Commission
apparently feared that complete reliance on the trending method would
be reversed. Its solution, also ingenious, was to rely on both methods
without relying exclusively on either."
The result was a price differential of two cents (14.5 as opposed
to 16.5). This was substantially less than the differential in the area
price guidelines. The Examiner had come much closer to the guideline differential. It is interesting to speculate why the Commission
decreased it. One reason was that, since the Examiner had used the
trending method, albeit incorrectly, the Commission was required to
pay some attention to its results when applied correctly. In any case,
the cost methodology for new gas, with its large component of current
expenses, required that the cost of old gas be compatible and this
compatibility could only be achieved through the backtrend method.
Second, the Commission had originally promised upon issuing the
guidelines that the differential would be reduced and eventually
eliminated. 91 Third, the Commission may have been uncomfortable
with the fact that the two price system amounted to price discrimination. And fourth, the increase above the old gas guideline price is
in accord with the Commission's general tendency to raise the price of
gas under old contracts, while putting a ceiling on new gas prices.
The most notable instance of this practice is the Commission's inexplicable action raising the price of all gas to a floor of 9.00 cents,
no matter what the contract price.9" But the fact remains that the
amount of the differential, 12 per cent of the new gas price, is substantial.
It is one of the puzzling aspects of the Permian Basin decision
that the two price system has not been treated as a problem of price
89

Id.at 213-14.
90 Id. at 218.
91 Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818, 819 (1960): "It is
anticipated that these differences in price levels will be reduced and eventually eliminated as subsequent experience brings about revisions in the prices in the various

areas." Because of the substantial amount of gas in the Permian Basin flowing under

older contracts, the guideline price spread was greater than in any other area.
92
Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 231. The Commission gives no reason for this
action. The Examiner was probably led to this result by his rate design for old
gas, quite different from the Commission's, which involved compressing existing
contract prices around a 12 cent average. Initial Decision, 34 F.P.C. at 365-69. But

the Examiner ordered the increases only with the consent of the purchaser, which
probably would not have been forthcoming. Id. at 369.
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discrimination. 3 The Commission supported the two price system for
the same reasons that a monopsonist engages in price discriminationmore gas for less. But it did not discuss the legality of its pricing
system in light of the strong historic policies against price discrimination. Nor did the parties raise the issue in that way. Perhaps the
reason is that the two price system resembles the basic pricing system
that has been introduced into the industry through the institution of
the long term contract. Because of the long term contract and the
upward price trend since World War II, gas flowing under old contracts traditionally has been cheaper than gas under new contracts.
This differential has been diminished, however, by the prevalence in
the industry of most-favored nation clauses, which permit sellers under
old contracts to obtain higher prices when there is an increase in the
market for uncommitted reserves. 4 The problem of differential prices
under long term contracts in an unregulated market has never been
thought to constitute price discrimination. In price regulated markets,
however, it has been customary to bar such contracts because they
lead to discrimination. Following this tradition, the Federal Power
Commission once eliminated just such differences in a natural gas
company's rate structure on the ground that they were "unjust, unreasonable and unduly discriminatory." '5
Not only might the two price system violate the "just and reasonable" standard of the Natural Gas Act because it constitutes systematic
price discrimination; it may also require a violation of the Robinson93 But ef. Joint and Several Brief of Petitioners at 64-79, Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC,
375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967), which argues that "Dual Pricing is illegal," although
the system is never described as price discrimination.
94 Clauses permitting redetermination of price were numerous in natural gas
sales contracts prior to 1962. On February 14, 1962, the Commission issued a regulation limiting price redetermination clauses in contracts executed after April 3,
1961, to the following:
(a) Provisions that change a price in order to reimburse the seller for
all or any part of the changes in production, severance, or gathering taxes
levied upon the seller; (b) Provisions that change a price to a specific amount
at a definite date; and (c) Provisions that, once in five-year contract periods
during which there is no provision for a change in price to a specific amount
(paragraph (b) of this section), change a price at a definite date by a priceredetermination based upon and not higher than a producer rate or producer
rates which are subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, are not in
issue in suspension or certificate proceedings, and, are in the area of the
price in question.
27 Fed. Reg. 1357 (1962), 18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (1967). The regulation was upheld
in FPC v. Texaco, 377 U.S. 33 (1964). In 1966, the Commission liberalized this
regulation by also allowing "Provisions that permit a change in price to the applicable just and reasonable area ceiling rate which has been, or which may be, prescribed by the Commission for the quality of gas involved." 31 Fed. Reg. 15486
(1966), 18 C.F.R. § 154.93(b-1). If all natural gas sales contracts were drafted pursuant to paragraph (b-1), then the only source of price differentials in the pricing
structure would be the Commission's two price system.
95 Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 252 F.2d 619, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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Patman Act."' The two price system requires a seller to sell a commodity of like grade and quality to different purchasers at different
pricesY7 The Commission's cost computations would not be sufficient
to support a cost justification defense under the Act." The only
aspects of the Act which require extended discussion are the requirement that the discriminatory sales be consummated contemporaneously 9 9 and the requirement of injury to competition."
It can be argued that, since gas is sold only when the long term
contract committing it to interstate commerce is made and the price
ceilings apply to contracts made at different times, the difference in
price is not between sales made under substantially similar conditions
and, therefore, the two price system does not violate the RobinsonPatman Act. There are two answers to this argument. First, if associated gas is of the same grade and quality as gas well gas, then
identical gas is sold at different prices at the same time. (Although
it can be argued that associated gas is probably not of the same grade
or quality, since the deliverability of associated gas--determined
by state oil production allowances-makes it less desirable than gas
well gas). Second, it is not entirely accurate to characterize the sale
of gas as taking place at the time the contract is made. To the extent
contracts contain indeterminate pricing provisions, the sale takes place
at the time the price is determined. A seller could not defend a charge
of price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act on the ground
that the lower priced sale was made under a requirements contract
providing that sales under the contract would be at the market price.
For example, if all natural gas contracts provided that the price would
96 Clayton Act § 2, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), amending 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 13 (1964). It is not clear whether the fact that a producer engages in
price discrimination under Commission compulsion will immunize him from civil
liability. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides that an asset acquisition approved by
the Federal Power Commission does not violate the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
There is no similar provision in section 2.
97 It is possible that no seller in the Permian Basin sells new gas to one pipeline
and old gas to a competitor, but the number of sellers involved in the market makes
this improbable.
OSA manufacturer would not be able to justify price discrimination under the
Act by proving that he served his favored customers from an old plant and his disfavored customers from a new plant. See F. RowF, PRicF DiScRIMIATIoN Uxmza
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 283-84 (1st ed. 1962).
9 Since a "discrimination" can arise only from pricing disparities in reasonably
comparable transactions under "similar circumstances," the "prohibition of the statute
cannot come into play if the pertinent sales are too far apart in time." Id. at 48.
100 Discrimination is unlawful:
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either

of them.
15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
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be the applicable area rate (as the Commission now permits),111 then
price would be determined for both old and new gas at the same time
and under the same conditions.
The other argument that can be made against application of the
Robinson-Patman Act to the two price system is that no showing has
been made of injury to competition. This argument is easily answered.
The effect of the Commission's two price system is to favor long
established gas pipeline companies, which have a high percentage of
old gas contracts, over pipeline companies which have recently entered
the field and which, therefore, have few or no old gas contracts. Given
the Commission's average cost pricing policy for pipelines, it will be
difficult for any new entrant to underprice an existing pipeline, assuming that the entrant's transmission costs are the same. The price
offered by the existing pipeline will be based on an average which
reflects the lower cost of the old gas contracts. This process will never
end. The Commission apparently envisages that the two price system
will become a three price system. When and if gas shortages develop
and there is increasing need to induce the development of additional
supplies, the Commission will then establish an even higher "new new"
gas well price. Thus, in the 1970's, when the established gas pipelines
have used up all of their old gas, they will still have an advantage,
because the entrants will have to buy "new new" gas while the
established pipelines are selling new gas. A pricing policy which restrains entry is the most significantly anti-competitive pricing policy
possible.'
But it is consonant with other aspects of FPC policy,
which appear to disfavor competition among pipelines. 0 3
Which leaves the question: Does the Robinson-Patman Act apply
to natural gas companies acting in accord with F.P.C. regulation?
There is no authority on the point, but it is difficult to construct an
argument that it does not. The Robinson-Patman Act is textually
part of the Clayton Act. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which regulates
101 18 C.F.R. § 154.93(b-1) (1967).
102 A two price system which provided for a lower price on the new gas would

not have this effect, and therefore would not violate the Robinson-Patman Act.
-03 The most notable instance has been the Commission's approval of the merger
of El Paso Natural Gas Co. with Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp., 22 F.P.C. 1091
(1959), rev'd, California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962). The Supreme Court
ultimately held that the merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. United States v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). Entry of a third pipeline into the
California market was barred by the Commission in Transwestern Pipeline Co., F.P.C.
Opinion 500 (July 26, 1966). Gulf Pacific Pipeline Co., a subsidiary of Tenneco, Inc.
and a newcomer to the California market, proposed to build a pipeline from the Katy
and Pledger fields to Los Angeles, exclusively for the purpose of supplying gas to
electric utilities in Los Angeles. The Commission denied the proposal and ordered
instead that the gas should be provided through expansion of the capacity of existing
pipeline companies.
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mergers, has been held applicable to natural gas companies, 10 4 although
it expressly provides that merger transactions approved by the Federal
Power Commission are immunized." 5 While the Clayton Act contains
provisions providing for special treatment of some regulated industries, 106 there is no exemption for companies subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Power Commission. The Robinson-Patman Act does
not apply to most regulated industries because they sell services rather
than commodities, 10 7 but natural gas is clearly a commodity. Nor
does the Natural Gas Act contain such a comprehensive system of regulation of price discrimination as to necessitate construing the RobinsonPatman Act as inapplicable. Section 4(b) of the Natural Gas Act
provides:
No natural-gas company shall, with respect to any transportation or sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, (1) make or grant any undue preference or
advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue
prejudice or disadvantage, or (2) maintain any unreasonable
difference in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other
respect, either as between localities or as between classes of
service.10o
Although this provision clearly includes price discrimination also
covered by the Robinson-Patman Act, it is more particularly concerned with two phenomena-differentials between geographic locations and classes of service-which the Robinson-Patman Act does
not reach because of its requirement of injury to competition. The
anti-discrimination provisions of the Natural Gas Act are broadly
focused on fairness as between customers or classes of customers, not
on injury to competition between customers. At the very least the
Robinson-Patman Act, and the historic legislative aversion to price
discrimination which it reflects, provide part of the content of the
standard of "just and reasonable" prices under sections 4 and 5 of
the Natural Gas Act. The Commission, however, gave no consideration to the injury to competition which its two price system would
104

California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).

105 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964): "Nothing contained in this section shall apply to
transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given by the . . . Federal
Power Commission."
108sSee, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§20, 21(a) (1964).
107 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Amana Mfg., Inc., 295 F2d 375 (7th
Cir. 1961) (advertising is not a commodity) ; Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1934) (transportation is not a commodity).
See generally, F. RowE, PRICE DISCRImINATION UNDER THE ROBINSoN-PATmMA ACT
59-62 (1st ed. 1962).
108 15 U.S.C. § 717c(b) (1964).
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cause. It benefits the consumer little to exchange more :expensive gas
in the field for the inefficiencies inevitable in pipelines perpetually
shielded from effective competition.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The Permian Basin case, if presented and argued to the Supreme
Court in the same way it has been argued before the Commission
and the Tenth Circuit, will look very different from the case described
in this article. As long as cost is treated as the only relevant issue
for the determination of the area ceilings, the case is quite simple.
If the Court feels that its function in reviewing the decision is simply
to assure itself of the formal consistency of the Commission's reasoning,
then it should follow the Tenth Circuit and remand the case to permit
the Commission to dress up its cost logic. If the Court feels that its
function is to review the substance of the cost computations, then it
should remand and require the Commission to revise the factors which,
with little cost logic to support them, have increased the resulting
prices. But before the Court takes this step, which would be a logical
reaction to the case as it has developed, it should consider the non-cost
reasons for setting the price ceilings higher than cost. And if it does
so, then it must confront the issues of whether the recognition of
expectations based on existing rate structures is permitted or required
in price regulation and whether a price freeze result is "just and reasonable" under traditional regulatory statutes. In addition, the Court
must face the novel issue of whether compulsory price discrimination
injurious to competition is legal in a regulated industry, both under
the "just and reasonable" standard of regulatory statutes and under
the Robinson-Patman Act.
In reviewing the Permian Basin decision the Court will be
under substantial pressure to affirm and thereby to avoid adding
another set of hearings to a regulatory history which already has
been painfully slow. But confrontation of these issues does not require
that the decision be remanded for further hearings. It is possible to
read the Commission's decision as holding that the new gas ceiling
price has been set at its present level, not because of a price freeze
policy, but because the Commission has concluded that the in-line price
has proved sufficiently high to stimulate the necessary amount of
exploration and development."' The old gas price is more difficult,
since it is not supported by cost. Considerations of result are irrelevant
for any price above 11 cents. It appears to be supported only by a
109

Opinion 468, 34 F.P.C. at 183-85.

THE PERMIAN BASIN AREA RATE CASES

desire to introduce some, but not too much, monopsony price discrimination into the rate structure and to perpetuate that discrimination
through a price freeze. If the Court finds that such a rate is not just
and reasonable, it can simply direct that the ceiling price for all gas
should be the same.
If the Court affirms, it can make a substantial contribution to
natural gas regulation by taking two steps. First, it should acknowledge that the cost computations do not support the resulting price
levels and, in upholding the result, should rely on the Commission's
determination that present supplies are adequate. This would vastly
simplify natural gas regulation for the future, by freeing the regulation
from the complexity of cost calculations. Second, the Court should
acknowledge the importance of recognizing expectations based on price
levels validated by the Commission in the past. Consumers of interstate gas should not be required to pay for the unnecessary contingency
that the rates on gas committed to interstate commerce will be reduced
by the Commission in the future.

